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Statement of the Issues Presented on Appeal 
Contrary to the claims set-forth in the Appellants brief the matter before the Third 
District Court and this court has nothing to do with Eviction and Unlawful detainer. The issues 
before this Court are whether or not funds deposited into a bank account are exempt from 
garnishment and were the Appellants entitled to the 25% they received pursuant to the Order of 
the Third District Court. 
Statement of the Facts 
A writ of garnishment was issued on September 28,2000 to Key Bank of Utah. The 
application set-forth that the funds held by Key Bank did "not consisting of earnings from 
personal services" (Record at pg. 246). Writ of Garnishment was returned and filed with the 
Third District Court on or about October 4, 2000. Defendant/Appellee filed a Request for 
Hearing on or about October 5, 2000. The hearing, subject of this appeal, was held on October 
16,2000 at 8:14 AM before the Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki. 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki signed on or about October 23,2000 the order, issued pursuant 
to the directives of the Court. Counsel for the Plaintiffs/Appellants filed his Notice of Appeal on 
or about October 31, 2000. In addition, Appellants filed a third Application for Writ of 
Garnishment to Key Bank of Utah. Subsequent to that filing and on or about November 8, 2000 
filed a Request for Hearing. A hearing was held on November 20, 2000 at which time the Court 
again ruled in favor of the Defendant/Appellees objections. On November 15, 2000 Counsel for 
the Appellant's filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to consolidate this Appeal (Exhibit 
"A") with a previous appeal filed by the Defendant/Appellee and Docketed in the Court of 
Appeals at 20000611-CA. On or about December 15,2000, this Court issued its ruling on that 
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motion and granted the Appellee's request to consolidate this appeal and the appeal of 
Defendants, but limited that consolidation to Decision only (Exhibit "B"). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT #1 
Is it a matter of law that once deposited funds change their characteristics as 
stated by the Appellants and do they loose their exempt status? 
Counsel for the Appellant's has repeatedly maintained that it is a Matter of Law that once 
funds are deposited into a bank account they loose their original characteristics. The Appellee's 
maintain that the law clearly states that this is not the true. Counsel for the Appellant's have 
turned to other jurisdictions in which to support their argument, or have attempted to equate bank 
accounts to tax returns because they lack a "periodic nature". Yet, with all the arguments 
presented Counsel for the Appellant's he has yet to site the relevant portions of Utah Law to 
support his position. The reason for this is clear. Because, Utah law clearly states the opposite 
of his position. Furthermore, after 3 hearings the Trial court has. maintained the same consistent 
opinion. That wages are exempt from garnishment, at least in part. 
Counsel has also argued that the Appellant's have repeatedly issued their Writs of 
Garnishment in compliance with Rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. While the 
issuance of these Writs may have been consistent with the rules, the Motivation behind their 
issuance remains questionable. Based on the argument presented by Counsel for the Appellant's 
then the governing rule for issuance and authority of a Writ of Garnishment would be Rule 64D. 
Let us take a look at this rule and see how it applies to the Issuance of a Writ and the authority of 
that Writ over the Property subject to Garnishment. 
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Counsel for the Appellant's sets out in his Brief those aspects of Rule 64D relevant to his 
clients and pertaining to the issuance and authority of a Writ of Garnishment. He states in his 
brief (Addendum 1), that pursuant to Rule 64D (a)(ii) a Writ is 
"... available in aid of execution to satisfy a money judgment or other 
order requiring the payment of money. Such judgment and orders are hereinafter 
sometimes referred to collectively as 'judgment'". 
This clearly means that the Appellants have the right to use a Writ of Garnishment in order to 
collect on a money judgment or other judgment commanding the payment of monies. But that is 
all that this section gives. Therefore we can conclude that Counsel is correct in his assessment 
that the Appellants have the right to and can legally issue a Writ of Garnishment. However, with 
that right come certain restrictions and or conditions. For example, Counsel for the Appellants 
cites Rule 64D (a)(iii) in which he says: 
" The property subject to garnishment that a writ may be used to levy upon or 
affect is all the accrued credits, chattels, goods, effects, debts, chose in actions, 
money, and other personal property and rights to property of the defendant in the 
possession of a third person, or under the control or constituting a performance 
obligation to the defendant of any third person ..." (Appendum 1)(URCP Rule 
64D (a)(iii) 
What is absent from this abbreviated section is the restrictions. Counsel and his clients take this 
statement as giving them the authority to garnish the totality of the Appellee's bank account. 
They are correct in that they may obtain rights to money that is the property of the defendant and 
in possession of a third party; however, they ignore several very important aspects of this 
authority. The aspects that they ignore are set-forth in the remainder of this section, which says: 
".. .whether due or yet to become due at the time of service of the writ of 
garnishment, which are NOT exempt from garnishment or exempt under 
ANY applicable provisions of state or federal law (hereinafter sometimes 
referred to as 'Property Subject to Garnishment'." (URCP Rule 64D (a)(iii) 
emphasis mine) 
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This clearly shows that a writ of garnishment may only attach those monies available at the time 
the writ is served and ONLY if the monies in question are NOT exempt from garnishment. This 
rule clearly and succinctly states that only those monies available at the time the Writ is issued 
would be available for garnishment and then only if they are NOT exempt according to the 
appropriate state OR federal statute. By counsel and his clients ignoring this aspect of Rule 64D 
they seek to obtain access to funds that would otherwise be unavailable to them. 
There is one other very important fact that this section clearly establishes and that is 
contrary to the claims being maintained by Counsel for the Appellants. That fact is that there are 
specific monies that are exempt under applicable state and federal statutes. This clearly means 
that state law has established that certain monies can not be garnished from the defendant. In 
addition it would also restrict the Appellants from garnishing specific monies under federal law. 
But what are those restrictions? And which monies are Exempt from Garnishment? 
To determine what monies are NOT subject to garnishment we need only to continue 
reading through the governing rule—Rule 64D. Rule 64D (d)(i) addresses the content of the 
Writ and whom it should be directed. In part this section states: 
"The writ of garnishment shall be issued in the name of the State of Utah AND 
shall be directed to the person or persons designated in the plaintiffs 
affidavit or APPLICATION as garnishee or garnishees, advising each such 
person that each is attached as garnishee in the action, and commanding them 
not to pay OR deliver ANY NON-EXEMPT PROPERTY SUBJECT TO 
GARNISHMENT as defined in Subdivision (a)(iii) herein in their 
possession..." (Rule 64D (d)(i) Emphasis mine 
From this it is clear that the Writ is to be issued to the party designated in the Appellant's 
Application for Garnishment. It also states that the garnishee is required to withhold payment of 
any "NON-EXEMPT" property. This statement clearly distinguishes between exempt and Non-
exempt property. Therefore, if the property is exempt it may not be withheld. But the rule has 
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not yet specified what constitutes "Exempt Property". For that we must turn to section (d)(iv) of 
Rule 64D. This section establishes that the Notice of Garnishment and Exemptions to be served 
on the Defendant must contain certain information about which monies are exempt. This section 
states, in part, that: 
"The notice of garnishment and exemptions that is to be served upon the 
defendant and others entitled to its receipt shall indicate that certain money is 
EXEMPT FROM GARNISHMENT including but not limited to, Social 
Security benefits, Supplemental Security Income benefits, Veteran's benefits, 
unemployment benefits, Worker's Compensation benefits, public assistance 
(welfare), alimony, child support, certain pensions, and PART OR ALL OF 
WAGES OR OTHER EARNINGS FROM PERSONAL SERVICES.'(Rule 
64D (d)(iv) Emphasis mine 
This section clearly and indisputably establishes what, in the possession of the third party, is 
exempt from garnishment. And as this section indicates PART or ALL of ones wages or other 
earnings from personal services IS undeniably exempt. 
From this we see that the controlling rule URCP Rule 64D et seq. clearly establishes that, 
as a matter of law, all or part of wages from personal services, would be exempt. We need not 
turn to other jurisdictions to determine what Utah's position is on this matter. Nor do we have to 
imply from other cases not similar to this that wages from personal services is exempt. We need 
only to review the decision of the Trial court in light of the evidence presented to reach our 
conclusions. And what is interesting about this rule is that it applies to monies in control of the 
Defendant or in the possession of a third party. Therefore the conclusion of Counsel for the 
Appellants that monies deposited into a bank account change their characteristics is totally and 
completely wrong. It is clear that "source" is more important than location. It is clear from this 
rule that those monies that are exempt are from specific sources. There is no indication that 
these funds change characteristics as implied by Counsel for the Appellant's. 
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Aside from the Fact that Rule 64D determines what monies can be garnished we also 
have the concession made by Counsel himself in the October 16, 2000 hearing itself. In that 
hearing he stated that if the money in the bank account was derived from wages than it would be 
exempt. The Court stated in its determination that: 
"...while I agree in principal and generally with your statement, Mr. Mohlman, I 
think I also have to look at your concession, that if he can prove that the 
amounts were a result of direct deposits, then - then they could be exempt in that 
- in that vein." Exhibit "C" pg. 12. 
What is interesting about Mr. Mohlman's argument and what the Court took into consideration 
was the evidence being presented by the Appellants. The document that was submitted was not 
consistent with Rule 64D. Rule 64D (a)(iii) which establishes what property is garnishable, 
clearly says that only those funds that are 'due or yet to become due at the time of service of the 
writ" are subject to garnishment. The document presented by Appellants was from 6 months 
prior to the issuance of the Writ. The Appellants continued acknowledgement of only the 
authority aspect of this Rule and their failure to recognize the conditional aspects of the Rule 
shows their clear and continued disregard for the Rule of the Law. 
The only aspect of the Law counsel and his clients wish to acknowledge is that which 
gives them the authority to act. Their reflisal to accept the conditions for their action shows their 
disregard for the Law. Counsel for the Appellants has gone so far as to apply his own conditions 
for the extension of exemption status to certain funds. In the October hearing he declared that: 
"... And I think, as far as I understand the law, and I would like to argue that for a 
minute, Mr. Diefenderfer only has the claim of exemption if he can prove to this 
Court if EVERY deposit EVER made into this account was from - from 
wages. And once he fails in that proof or there is contrary proof otherwise, — " 
(Exhibit "C" pgs. 6-7) 
This statement clearly indicates that Counsel believes along with his clients that in order for an 
individual to claim exemption of wages, EVERY deposit must come from wages. Rule 64D 
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does not place this requirement on the party claiming exemption. They simply must prove that at 
the time of the issuance of the Writ the monies claimed under the exemption fit the conditions 
established by this Rule. In addition Counsel for the Appellant's also requires that all the 
deposits made into the account be coming from direct deposited wages. Again this is not what 
Rule 64D requires. Counsel's refusal to acknowledge that not all employers provide to their 
employees direct deposit has place undue and unnecessary burdens of proof onto the Appellees 
while maintaining that the Appellants need not prove any of their allegations. The additional 
requirements are not for compliance of the Rules but rather to apply additional restrictions on the 
Appellees. 
Throughout the various hearing held in this matter, Counsel and his clients have failed to 
present any material evidence to support their claims. They simply "believed" something is true 
and than conclude that it must be based on their personal beliefs. Careful examination of the 
record will show that they have made several unsubstantiated claims, which remain unproven. 
For example, in their application on September 28, 2000, the Appellants stated, affirmatively that 
the money in the bank account was "not earnings from personal services". Yet the record shows 
that they had supplemental hearings and even subpoenaed records which showed that the only 
monies going into the bank account of the Appellees was from wages. Given that fact, the 
application provided for the Writ of Garnishment contained blatantly false information. 
Another example of this is the evidence presented on October 16, 2000. In the 
Transcripts Counsel states that on page 2 of the evidence (Record at 260) the deposits shown 
clearly indicate that the Appellees were not depositing wages but were making deposits from 
"other accounts" (Exhibit "C" pg. 6). More precisely he says: 
" . . . then two other customer deposits in April 6th and April 11th of $1,300 and 
$1,700, clearly evidencing that, contrary to his claim, not every deposit he ever 
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makes into his account is direct deposit from his employer. Obviously, he is 
making deposits from other accounts." (Exhibit "C", pg.6) Emphasis mine 
According to his assertion, this document proves that not every deposit came from wages. The 
evidence presented does not substantiate the claim that the funds deposited are "obviously 
coming from other accounts". What is obvious is not that the funds being deposited were 
coming from other accounts, but that the Appellants believe them to be coming from some 
unknown and undocumented fantasy account. The evidence provided by the Appellants proves 
none of the claims made by the Appellants. 
What we can deduce from the Determinative Rule governing this action, Rule 64D, is 
that regardless of where the funds come from, they clearly retain their original characteristics 
even when they are in the possession of a third party. The list of monies that are exempt clearly 
includes part or all of wages from personal services. Counsel's contention that these monies 
change characteristic is a vain attempt to justify the improper behavior of his clients. While their 
actions may be excused in the first hearing, once clearly identified as wages these funds should 
have been left alone. Instead, the Appellants continued the behavior and seized these clearly 
exempt funds two more times. On both occasions they claimed that the monies were something 
other than wages. The Appellants have used lies, supposition, and innuendoes to justify their 
taking of monies that are BY THE RULES exempt. Their intent is to control the funds of the 
Appellees through false claims thereby causing the Appellees harm and at same time unjustly 
enriching themselves. Each time the Appellants seize these funds by falsely identifying them as 
"not earnings from personal services", they cause the Appellees harm. The Appellees are 
subsequently hit with overdraft fees and returned check fees because of the actions of the 
Appellants. Once is excusable, three times is deliberate. 
POINT #2 
Did the court contradict Rule 64D by awarding the Appellant's 25% of the 
Appellee's bank account? 
Counsel for the Appellant's has argued in both his brief and in Court that URCP Rule 
64D provides for the garnishment of a Defendants wages from his/her employer. The maximum 
allowed under this rule is what the Appellees refer to as the 25% rule, which restricts the 
garnishment to 25% of the Defendants disposable income. The Appellees concur with this 
argument; however for different reasons. Counsel's argument centers on his conviction that the 
Appellees can not only take the 25% from the employer, but can also take the remainder of an 
individual's wages if it is deposited into the bank. This is rooted in their continual assertion that 
the monies deposited into a bank account change characteristics. 
In Appendum 1 of the Appellant's brief, Counsel states that URCP Rule 64D (d)(vi) 
states that: 
"A writ of garnishment attaching earnings for personal services shall attach 
ONLY that portion of the defendant's accrued and UNPAID disposable 
earnings hereinafter specified. The writ shall so advise the garnishee and shall 
direct the garnishee to withhold from the defendant's accrued disposable 
earnings only the amount pursuant to the writ. Earnings for personal services 
shall be deemed to accrue on the last day of the period in which they were earned 
or to which they relate..." (URCP Rule 64D (d)(vi) 
Again what Counsel for the Appellants fails to take into his theory is the remainder of this 
section which clearly says that the Writ must be served on the employer prior to payment of 
funds to the defendant. He ignores the section he cites which also clearly establishes that the 
wages must be "UNPAID". Once paid the 25% is no longer available to the Plaintiff. 
This interpretation appears to be consistent with the initial interpretation of Counsel for 
the Appellants, with the exception being that once paid the Appellants believe they are entitled to 
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100% of the funds. This raises and interesting question about the events that transpired in the 
October 16, 2000 hearing. If what Counsel argues is correct and the 25% only applies when the 
funds are in the hands of the employer, why than did he request from the Court that they be 
allowed to receive the 25% as if it remained unpaid to the Appellee? (Exhibit "C", pg. 14) We 
can speculate but that would be all that we could do. However, based on Counsels arguments 
and the Transcripts of Proceedings it is obvious that Counsel wanted to obtain something for his 
efforts whether it be proper or not. Since the Court had already once indicated that bank 
accounts were exempt when they came from wages, it is ludicrous to believe that the Court 
would reverse that position (Record at 232 pgs. 6-7). From this and the previous hearing it is 
clear that the 25% was available to the Appellants while in the hands of the Employer but once 
paid they were off limits. 
Conclusions 
The Appellants have taken it upon themselves to seek the courts permission to commit 
acts that are not only improper according to the governing rule, URCP Rule 64D; but they are 
asking this court to sanction unconscionable acts. They are literally asking this court to set aside 
URCP Rule 64D and permit them to remove all the funds the Appellees have at their disposable 
being fully aware of the fact that the only income the Appellees have is from Mr. Diefenderfer's 
wages. They believe that funds in a bank account change characteristics and that the law of other 
jurisdictions supports that theory, thereby ignoring the governing rule they also claim to be 
following. Both can not be true. If what Counsel says is true, than the Appellants the right to 
dictated every aspect of the Appellees lives. In order for the Appellees to meet their basic needs, 
they may not deposit any money into a bank account. They have taken the freedom of choice 
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away from the Appellees and they claim that they have the right to do so according to URCP 
Rule 64D. But this is not limited to the Appellees. 
If this Court rules in favor of the Appellants, than they will be sending a very strong 
message to every creditor. That message is that if someone owes you money than you have the 
authority to take every thing, including the debtor's right to survival, away simply because they 
owe you money. The United States Supreme Court says, in a case cited several times by 
Counsel for the Appellants, that taking away a party's ability to meet their basic necessities is 
strictly forbidden (Kokoszka v. Bel ford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974)). If a Trustee in bankruptcy 
proceedings can't do this, than surely it is not acceptable in a Garnishment action. If State 
agencies can not take this action for the Support of dependent Children, than why would we 
allow private citizens to take such action? Without a statute to the contrary it is clear that the 
actions taken by the Appellants is not permitted. 
What makes this even more horrendous is the fact that the actions being taken are with 
full knowledge that the truth is contrary to their claims. Counsel for the Appellants is fully 
aware of the position of the Appellees, after all they did have supplemental proceedings. In 
addition they even subpoenaed bank records which further supported the position of the 
Appellees. Despite the facts the Appellants still continue to adhere to some fantasy claims they 
have yet to support with any tangible material evidence. Examples already presented in this brief 
clearly show that they refuse to believe the facts. And the facts are undisputed. What evidence 
is presented is not only speculative at best but usually not applicable to the actions taken. And 
all of this is being done, supposedly, in accordance with URCP Rule 64D. On two separate 
occasions the Court has direct the Appellants to seek either other property to execute upon or to 
go directly to the employer. In total disregard for the suggestions of the Court the Appellants 
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have repeatedly gone after the Appellees bank account. Yet it is not unusual for Counsel or his 
clients to ignore the Courts. 
Counsel, in his Appellants Brief stated that this action is a consolidated action. What he 
did not mention is the fact that by order of this court on December 15, 2000 this case was 
consolidated, with the previous appeal of the Defendants case number 20000611-CA, but for 
DECISION only (Exhibit "B"). Counsel took it upon himself to consolidate the cases for all 
aspects thereby sidestepping the decision of the Court. He did this in order to submit to this 
Court information presented in the hearing resulting in this appeal; thereby, confusing the issues 
in both appeals. It gives this Court the appearance that his Clients submit evidence in the first 
hearing that persuaded the Trial court into its decision. It gives a false impression that the Trial 
court changed its position from the first hearing to this hearing when in reality the Trial Court 
has never changed it position. It would make it easier for this Court to overturn a decision of the 
Trial Court if it changed its position. However, the transcripts make it clear that the position of 
the Trial Court has never changed. 
The actions of the Appellants are clear, they intend to cause harm. These people have 
taken only those aspects of the rules, which give them the authority to act, disregarding the 
aspects of the rules that place conditions on those actions. Counsel is the same. The Appendum 
submitted in his Appellants brief clearly shows that only certain aspects apply to his clients. As 
indicated he cites only the "RELEVANT PORTIONS"; whereby obviously ignoring those 
portions that he feels do not apply, yet are the conditional requirements of the rules. He takes 
those aspects he believes apply to his clients and which justify their actions; while at the same 
time applying additional conditions on the Appellees that are not an aspect of the rules. For 
example, the rule states that the party seeking exemption need only show that the monies, as in 
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this case, going into an account are exempt at the time of the issuance of the Writ. Counsel has 
stated that the party claiming exemption must show, that EVERY deposit EVER deposited must 
be, as in this case, wages. His additional conditions are impossible to be proven and would 
require obtaining information that is not germane to the action. 
All of this behavior, including his request for monies that by his own argument are not 
available, are designed to circumvent the rules in favor of their blatantly inappropriate actions. 
In addition it is designed to get this court to sanction their actions of causing harm to the 
Appellees. Furthermore the Appellees believe that the actions taken by the Appellants were in 
violation of UCA 76-6-401 (l)(2)(3)(a)(5)(a)(b) and UCA 76-6-405 (1). In addition, the 
Appellees believe that such actions are also in violation of UCA 70C-7-103 and UCA 78-23-1 et 
seq. The Appellants blatantly false statements in their applications for Writ of Garnishment 
clearly show that they will go to any lengths to justify their actions, including but not limited to 
lying and holding the Appellees up to the Court in a False light. And with the aid of Counsel 
will attempt to perpetuate that belief by creating a false impression of the facts to this court. 
WHEREFORE, it is the prayer of the Appellees that this court uphold the decision of the 
Trial court in part and overturn in part. More specifically the Appellees respectfully request that 
this court: 
1) Uphold the decision of the trial court with regard to that aspect of the decision which 
held that the monies in the Appellees bank account were derived from wages and 
thereby exempt from garnishment; and, 
2) That the 25% awarded to the Appellants was incorrect and should be returned, plus 
interest. 
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In addition the Appellees respectfully request that this court find that the actions of the 
Appellants is contrary to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, more specifically, Rule 64D, and 
sanction both Counsel for the Appellants as well as the Appellants themselves. Furthermore the 
Appellees request that this court assess against the Appellants and their counsel whatever 
punitive damages it sees fit to assess. 
Dated th i s j j .day of February, 2001. 
Respectfully submitted by: 
cYL.a&5n>S& 
Russell J. Diefendferfef <^~— 
Appearing Pro Se 
P.O. Box 520714 
Salt Lake City, UT. 84152 
Telephone: (801) 484-7039 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I Russell J. Diefenderfer certify, that on February_L__ , 2001,1 served a true and 
correct copy of the APPELLEES BRIEF, by First Class mail, with sufficient postage prepaid to 
the Following addresses: 
SCHMUTZ, MOHLMAN, & ROHBOCK 
Attn: Jay R. Mohlman 
533 West 2600 South, Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Dated this *\ February, 2001 
^ Russell J. Diefen 
Appearing Pro Se 
P.O. Box 520714 
Salt Lake City, UT. 
84152-0714 
801-484-7039 
APPENDUM 
EXHIBIT "A: 
JayR. Mohlman(#5113) 
SCHMUTZ, MOHLMAN & ROHBOCK 
533 West 2600 South, Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 298-4800 
Facsimile: (801) 298-4804 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE SUPREME COURT AND/OR THE COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
GARY and KATHLEEN McFADDEN, MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION 
: OF APPEALS 
Plaintiffs, : 
v. : 
: Appellate Court Nos: 
RUSSELL J. DIEFENDERFER and : 
PAULA DIEFENDERFER, : 20000611 and 20000936 
Defendants. : 
Plaintiffs Gary and Kathleen McFadden, by and through their undersigned counsel, and 
pursuant to Rule 3(b) of the UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, hereby requests that 
the Court consolidate the two above-referenced appeals. The grounds and basis for this motion are 
that the two appeals are from the same trial court case, involve the same parties, and address almost 
identical issues. In the first appeal (case No. 20000611) the trial court denied Defendants' objection 
to Plaintiffs' garnishment of Defendants bank account, and in the second appeal (case No. 20000936) 
the trial court granted Defendants' objection to Plaintiffs' subsequent garnishment of Defendants' 
bank account. While the reasoning of the trial court in the two instances was slightly different, 
76405 00MC01 01 
judicial economy dictates that the appeals be consolidated 
DATED this / S ^ d a y of November, 2000. 
Jay^ 
of SCHMUTZ, MOHLMAN & ROHBOCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the '{=>& day of November, 2000,1 served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION OF APPEALS, by causing the same to be mailed, 
via first-class United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Russell J. Diefenderfer 
Paula Diefenderfer 
P.O. Box 520714 
Salt Lake City, UT 84152 
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EXHIBIT "B 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Gary and Kathleen McFadden, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
FILED 
Wah Court of Appeals 
DEC I 5 2000 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
Russell J. Diefenderfer and 
Paula Diefenderfer, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Gary and Kathleen McFadden, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Russell J. Diefenderfer and 
Paula Diefenderfer, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
ORDER OF 
CONSOLIDATION 
Case No. 20000611-CA 
Case No. 20000936-CA 
This matter is before the court on plaintiff McFadden's 
motion for consolidation of these appeals taken from orders 
entered in supplemental proceedings in the same case. The first 
appeal (case no. 60000611-CA) has been fully briefed; however, no 
briefing schedule has been set in the second appeal (case no. 
20000936-CA), which was recently poured over to this court from 
the Utah Supreme Court. The motion to consolidate is not opposed 
by defendant Diefenderfers. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeals are consolidated for 
purposes of decision, and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that McFaddenfs opening brief as 
appellants in case no. 20000936-CA shall be filed on or before 
January 29, 2000. 
Dated this 
FOR THE COURT: 
£ * day of December, 2000. 
<^2U /~ >a^^JP 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on December 15, 2000, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail to the parties listed below: 
RUSSELL J. DIEFENDERFER 
PO BOX 520714 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84152-0714 
JAY R. MOHLMAN 
DONALD B. ROHBOCK 
SCHMUTZ MOHLMAN & ROHBOCK 
533 W 2600 S SUITE 200 
BOUNTIFUL UT 84010 
PAULA J. DIEFENDERFER 
PO BOX 520714 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84154-0714 
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Case No. 20000936-CA 
EXHIBIT "C" 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
GARY McFADDEN and KATHLEEN 
McFADDEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RUSSELL J. DIEFENDERFER 
and PAULA DIEFENDERFER, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 990902659 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS 
TO GARNISHMENT 
(Videotape Proceedings^ 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 16th day of 
October, 2000, commencing at the hour of 8:14 a.m., the 
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause and that 
the following videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiffs: 
For the Defendants: 
JAY R. MOHLMAN 
Attorney at Law 
Nielsen & Senior 
60 East South Temple, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RUSSELL J. DIEFENDERFER 
Appearing Pro Se 
if* @(FY 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CtTY, UTAH 84107 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 THE COURT: —plaintiffs in this matter, but 
4 Russell Diefenderfer appears, as he has, pro se. 
5 This is before the Court on an objection to 
6 garnishment which has been duly filed by Mr. Diefenderfer, 
7 objecting and requesting a hearing as to a garnishment that 
8 was issued, somewhere in September of 2000, on a bank 
9 account of Key Bank. 
10
 \ Mr« Diefenderfer has indicated that his wage—the 
11 funds in the account are exempt from garnishment because 
12 they are wages or other earnings from personal services. 
13 Is that where we are this morning, Mr. 
14 Diefenderfer? 
15 MR. DIEFENDERFER: That's correct. 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Mohlman? 
17 MR. MOHLMAN: Yes, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Very well. Thank you. 
19 Having—having you lodged the request for hearing 
20 and your exemption application, what proof do you have, Mr. 
21 Diefenderfer, that these are funds that are deposited 
22 directly from your employer and that they constitute all 
23 from wages and personal earnings? 
24 MR. DIEFENDERFER: I brought with me payroll 
25 stubs and bank statements that came directly from the bank 
1 that show that all deposits are directly deposited. 
2 THE COURT: And that's the only source of any 
3 deposits into your account? 
4 MR. DIEFENDERFER: That is correct. 
5 THE COURT: May I see those amou—those exhibits, 
6 please? 
7 Have you had an opportunity to examine them, Mr. 
8 Mohlman? 
9 MR. MOHLMAN: No, I have not, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Did you give him copies? 
11 What is it that's marked out? 
12 MR. DIEFENDERFER: That's the original one that I 
13 showed you on June the 8th. If you'll look at the second 
14 packet, that's bank statements that match that first 
15 documentation and the third packet will show you payroll 
16 stubs matching deposits made into the account. 
17 THE COURT: Do you have a statement from your 
18 employer that in fact you are on a direct deposit with the 
19 bank? 
20 MR. DIEFENDERFER: The notice is the top of the 
21 payroll stubs and it'll say what deposits—what account 
22 it's being deposited into. 
23 J THE COURT: Mr. Mohlman, have you had opportunity 
24 | to briefly look at these and do they seem to support his 
25 | position? 
3 
MR. MOHLMAN: Yes, your Honor, I have had a 
chance to look at those and I think they do support his 
argument, but I have, obviously, counter arguments. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Rosie, I don/t know what's happened here 
(inaudible) I'm sorry. 
Very well. So, I think a prima facie case has 
been established and let me turn the time over to Mr. 
Mohlman to hear opposing argument. 
MR. MOHLMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 
Let me initially, your Honor, I did not ever 
receive a copy of his notice of hearing and his objections, 
I wasn't—before we came here today, I wasn't a hundred 
percent sure what was going to be his claim, but I assumed 
that it was that those, similar to the argument he made 
previously and so I have prepared somewhat for that 
argument. 
I would like to give the Court, with your 
permission, a document— 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. MOHLMAN: You're welcome, your Honor. I— 
THE COURT: Have you shown this to Mr. 
Diefenderfer? 
MR. MOHLMAN: I—I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 MR. MOHLMAN: He does have a copy. 
2 This is a document that was obtained pursuant to 
3 a subpoena duces tecum from his bank, which is the same 
4 account that he has just provided you the information. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 MR. MOHLMAN: This particular one that I've given 
7 you is sub—is prior to the documentation that Mr. 
8 Diefenderfer just provided to you with regard to his bank 
9 account. If I looked at his records accurately, he gave 
10 you documents starting in May or June. 
11 THE COURT: I've got balance on May 17th of 2000, 
12 on—the heading on one, and it looks like a statement, 
13 period ending 4-30-2000, which would be reflected in a 
14 similar type of deposit. Those are the two I have. 
15 MR. MOHLMAN: So, I think most of the documents 
16 he pro—or the documents he provided to you are just 
17 subsequent to this—this document, but this indicates the 
18 information for his checking account through April 19th, 
19 2000, probably, I assume from March 20th, 2000, through 
20 April 19. 
21 If you look at Page 2 of this document I've just 
22 give you, your Honor, and again, this is the same checking, 
23 same account we're talking about here, if you look at Page 
24 2, it lists five deposits into the account. 
25 THE COURT: Uh huh. 
5 
1 MR. MOHLMAN: One of which is a direct deposit 
2 from his employer. There was a (sic) ATM, looks like an 
3 ATM deposit is reflected in this document, which is, you 
4 know an ATM machine on March the 20th, of $967.02; another 
5 counter deposit which I assume means he went right—he or 
6 his wife or someone on his behalf, went directly to the 
7 counter at the bank and deposited funds in 13—in the 
8 amount of $1,300 on March 20th— 
9 THE COURT: Right. 
10 MR. MOHLMAN: —of this year. And then two other 
11 customer deposits in April 6th and April 11th of $1,300 and 
12 $1,700, clearly evidencing that, contrary to his claim, not 
13 every deposit he ever makes into his account is direct 
14 deposit from his employer. Obviously, he is making 
15 deposits from other accounts. 
16 THE COURT: So, your position is, at least on the 
17 document that you've shown me, that the Court should at 
18 least take into consideration a $967.02 deposit from an ATM 
19 deposit— 
20 MR. MOHLMAN: Correct. 
21 THE COURT: — a $1,300 deposit on 3-20 in 
22 addition to the ATM; a $1,300 deposit on 4-6 and a $1,700 
23 deposit on 4-11. 
24 MR. MOHLMAN: That's correct, your Honor. And I 
25 think, as far as I understand the law, and I would like to 
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1 argue that for a minute, Mr. Diefenderfer only has the 
2 claim of exemption if he can prove to this Court if every 
3 deposit ever made into this account was from—from wages. 
4 And once he fails in that proof or there is contrary proof 
5 otherwise,— 
6 THE COURT: Uh huh. 
7 MR. MOHLMAN: —then he loses that argument. And 
8 if you'll look at Rule 64(d), that applies to garnishments, 
9 I think the language implies without specifically saying, 
10 but if you look at especially Subsection (d) that deals 
11 with the exemption that Mr. Diefenderfer is claiming here 
12 that implies that that is only talking about garnishing 
13 wages from your employer. Uses the language, you know, the 
14 25 percent earning exemption is computed, you can only take 
15 25 percent of what is computed for the pay period, I'm 
16 quoting from— 
17 THE COURT: Right. 
18 MR. MOHLMAN: —Rule 64(d), compute it for the 
19 pay period for which the earnings accrued, which clearly 
20 from that language, implies that that exemption is only 
21 I applicable if you are garnishing those wages directly from 
22 I the employer. 
23 I I've done a fairly exhaustive search, your Honor, 
24 I and was not—have not been able to find any Utah appellate 
25 I court decisions in which this exact issue was addressed by 
I 
an appellate court; however, I have found a case that I 
think addresses this issue and—and while not directly, 
addresses the same issue. And that's the case of Funk vs. 
Utah State Tax Commission, it's 839 P.2d 818. That case, 
similar to Mr. Diefenderfer here, the—the garnishee—the 
garnishee in that case was claiming—or the person whose 
funds were being garnished, the bank in that case 
garnished—the bank had a judgment against an individual 
and garnished their tax returns. 
And they brought similar argument here, saying 
those tax returns, you can't—you can't obtain the entire 
amount of tax refund because that's obviously from ray 
earnings. The only reason I'm getting a tax refund is from 
my—my effort and wages. Tax returns are clearly tax— 
wages. And so therefore, the—the bank in that case that 
had the judgment is limited to 25 percent. 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected that and said 
that's not true, that is not the normal 25 exemption 
setting that we're talking about, the 25 percent exemption 
setting we're talking about is from an employer and these 
are not wages that are directly from that employer and 
therefore, that exemption doesn't apply. 
I'll just quickly cite to the Court two 
jurisdictions—or cases from jurisdictions outside of Utah 
in which they have held exactly like we're arguing here and 
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1 that is, once those funds hit his checking account, they 
2 lose their identity, your Honor, as wages. 
3 THE COURT: Yeah. 
4 MR. MOHLMAN: And— 
5 THE COURT: However, you can see that if he can 
6 track them and show that they are direct, as he has 
7 attempted to do, then he may very well have avail of the 
8 argument, but— 
9 MR. MOHLMAN: He could. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. 
11 MR. MOHLMAN: Your Honor, in fact, that issue is 
12 on appeal from Mr. Diefenderfer and I assume we'll get that 
13 issue decided by the Supreme Court— 
14 THE COURT: All right. 
15 MR. MOHLMAN: —are actually, it's been bumped to 
16 the Court of Appeals, will address that issue on appeal, 
17 but I think the law before the Court now and court—and 
18 many jurisdictions have held that and—and I've never— 
19 haven't found one jurisdiction that held otherwise; but 
20 I have always held once they hit the—the checking account, 
21 | they lose their veil of—unless, like you said, if he can 
22 I prove every single deposit was—entering into that account 
23 | was from wages, then maybe he's got that argument, but—but 
24 I I don't think he even maintains that argument in that— 
25 | under that argument, your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Mohlman. 
May I hear from you, Mr. Diefenderfer? 
MR. DIEFENDERFER: I have had a chance to review 
the document that Mr. Mohlman is addressing and I would 
like to note that it is dated April the 19th and he's 
addressing funds that are deposited into the account prior 
to April the 19th. 
If the Court will remember, we were here on June 
28th for this exact same reason. If I could direct the 
Court's attention to the first document at Page 5, you will 
notice at that time, the checking account balance was zero. 
Now, if these funds were deposited prior to that 
withdrawal, then Mr. Mohlman's argument would be that they 
were there and they were available for garnishment and 
would have been garnished the first time, but between June 
7th and present time, all monies going into the bank 
account are completely and entirely from wages. 
THE COURT: Okay. You had another objection, a 
previous objection to garnishment and the Court ruled 
against you on that matter and that was on June 28th of 
2000. 
MR. DIEFENDERFER: That's correct. 
THE COURT: That's what you're referring to. So# 
the objections to the garnishments were overruled and I'm 
assuming that the garnishments then handed over the money 
10 
1 that they had seized; is that correct? 
2 MR. DIEFENDERFER: That's correct. 
3 THE COURT: And so—so your position is, from 
4 that time forward, there was a zero amount and then— 
5 MR. DIEFENDERFER: There was a zero amount at 
6 that time. 
7 THE COURT: Let me—let me—let me—let me see if 
8 I track you. 
9 And that the records that you're giving me today 
10 are from when, May? 
11 MR. DIEFENDERFER: That's from May. That was the 
12 same document I gave you last time. 
13 THE COURT: All right. But the other documents 
14 you've given me begin on May 17th of 2000, indicating a 
15 series of deposits; correct? 
16 MR. DIEFENDERFER: That's correct. 
17 THE COURT: Up until when? 
18 MR. DIEFENDERFER: October the 10th was when I 
19 obtained the last statement. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. DIEFENDERFER: Which would have been my last 
22 re—my most recent deposit. 
23 J THE COURT: And from looking at your Key Choice 
24 I checking statements, just picking one out, October 10th, 
25 I there's a balance of approximately 831.82 and then the 
11 
1 deposits are indicated are the direct deposits that you 
2 have said, which makes your balance, after withdrawals and 
3 everything else like that and fees, a net amount. And 
4 that's your argument. 
5 MR. DIEFENDERFER: That is correct. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
7 Care to respond to that? 
8 MR. MOHLMAN: Again, your Honor, I think the law, 
9 at least that I understand from all jurisdictions is that 
10 once that money hits the checking account, it loses its 
11 unique identity as wages and therefore, it's not subject to 
12 the exemption anymore. 
13 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
14 And while I agree in principle and generally with 
15 your statement, Mr. Mohlman, I think I also have to look at 
16 your concession, that if he can prove that the amounts were 
17 a result of direct deposits, then—then they could be 
18 exempt in that—in that vein. 
19 It appears that that first June 28th, 2000, 
20 objection that I overruled cleared out the account. The 
21 I account from the doc—from the records that you have 
22 I indicated to me, Mr. Mohlman, pre-date that time. 
23 | The records that Mr. Diefenderfer has supplied to 
24 I me post-date that time, which would indicate to me that he 
25 I has borne the burden, at least as to this hearing, that the 
12 
1 funds that are deposited were as a result of direct deposit 
2 from his two employers as indicated—two employers; right? 
3 Or at least two sources from your employers? 
4 MR. DIEFENDERFER: Two sources. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. Same employer but two sources? 
6 Or two different employers? 
7 MR. DIEFENDERFER: At one point in time, it was 
8 two different employers. 
9 THE COURT: All right. And—and if your argument 
10 and I think your argument prevailed on the last objection 
11 to the garnishment, Mr. Mohlman, but I think on this one 
12 here, I'm going to have to sustain the objection. So, the 
13 Court will so rule and no costs or fees involved. 
14 Anything else this morning? 
15 And where is the thing on appeal? It's still 
16 over at the Court of Appeals, you said; right? 
17 MR. MOHLMAN: It is, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 MR. MOHLMAN: I think we have a briefing 
20 schedule— 
21 THE COURT: Hear your brief— 
22 MR. MOHLMAN: Yeah, we have our briefing 
23 I schedule, so— 
24 I THE COURT: Very well. All right. 
25 I MR. MOHLMAN: I assume—do you want an order 
13 
1 prepared pursuant to— 
2 THE COURT: And I would ask Mr. Diefenderfer, but 
3 pro se's have trouble coming up with orders. 
4 MR. DIEFENDERFER: I have prepared the order, 
5 your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Will you please prepare the order, 
7 Mr. Diefenderfer? Thank you. 
8 MR. MOHLMAN: And I assume that you're going to 
9 allow garnish—the garnishment as to the 25 percent? 
10 THE COURT: Yes. 
11 MR. MOHLMAN: And so that 75 percent will be 
12 returned, but the 25 percent— 
13 THE COURT: Twenty-five percent will be allowed. 
14 MR. MOHLMAN: Okay, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: You can either do it that way or you 
16 can go to the employer and it's just as easy doing the 25 
17 percent, but I'll just leave that up to you, however you 
18 want to do that. 
19 Thank you. We're in recess on this. 
20 | (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
21 
22 | * * * 
23 
24 
25 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court 
Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I 
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to 14, inclusive, to the best of my ability constitute a 
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Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 16th day of 
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of December, 2000. 
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TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
COMMON TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
EVERY 
Black's Law Dictionary: Each one of all; all separate individuals who constitute the 
whole, regarded one by one. The term is sometimes equivalent to "all"; and sometimes to 
"each". 
Webster's New World Dictionary: each, individually, and separately. The fullest 
possible; all that there could be; each group or interval 
EVER 
Black's Law Dictionary: Not defined in Blacks. 
Webster's New World Dictionary: at all times; always; at any time; at all; by any 
chance; in any way 
FROM 
Black's Law Dictionary: As used as a function word, implies a starting point, whether 
it be of time, place, or condition; and meaning having a starting point of motion, noting the point 
of departure, origin, withdrawal, etc., as he traveled "from" New York to Chicago. One meaning 
of "from" is "out of. Word "from" or "after" an event or day does not have an absolute and 
invariable meaning, but each should receive an inclusion or exclusion construction according to 
intention with which such word is used. Words "from" and "to", used in contract, may be given 
meaning to which reason and sense entitles them, under circumstances of case. 
Webster's New World Dictionary: beginning at; starting with; out of; by reason of or 
because of. 
PERSONAL 
Black's Law Dictionary: Appertaining to the person: belonging to an individual; 
limited to the person; having the nature or partaking of the qualities of human beings, or of 
movable property. 
Webster's New World Dictionary: private, individual; done in person or by oneself; 
involving human beings; of the body or physical appearance; having to do with the character, 
conduct, etc. of a certain person. Law of property that is movable or not attached to the land. 
WAGES 
Black's Law Dictionary: A compensation given to a hired person for his or her 
services. Compensation paid to employees based on time worked or output of production. 
Every form of remuneration payable for a given period to an individual for personal services, 
including salaries, commissions, vacation, pay, dismissal wages, bonuses and reasonable value of 
board, rent, housing lodging, payments in kind, tips, and any other similar advantage received 
from the individual's employer or directly with respect to work for him. Term should be 
broadly defined and includes not only periodic monetary earnings but all compensation for 
services rendered without regard to manner in which such compensation is computed. 
Webster's New World Dictionary: money paid to an employee for work done, usually 
on an hourly, daily, or piecework basis. 
ACCRUED 
Black's Law Dictionary: Derived from the Latin, "ad" and "creso", to grow to. In the 
past tense, in sense of due and payable; vested. Accrued Salary - Compensation to employee 
which is incurred by an employer BUT NOT YET PAYABLE. 
Webster's New World Dictionary: to come as a natural growth, advantage, or right. 
To be added to periodically as an increase; said esp. of interest on money. 
